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Band: The Importance of Updating Sexual Harassment Policies to Thwart S

NOTES

THE IMPORTANCE OF UPDATING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT POLICIES TO THWART SAME-SEX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION

Many employees-laypeople and professionals included-enjoy
'2
1

at work. For some individuals, "mooning,
horsing around
3
' 4
"bagging," "dry humping

and other vulgar

pranks5

"goosing,

might make for

1. For the uninitiated, to "moon" is to expose one's buttocks to another. See Crane v. Iowa
Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 194, 195-96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); see, e.g., EEOC v. Regency
Architectural Metals Corp., 896 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D. Conn. 1995) (describing a workplace where
it was not unusual for male workers to "drop their pants and moon" other male co-workers).
2. To "goose" is "'to poke or dig [a person] in some sensitive spot; esp: to poke [a person]
between buttocks with an upward thrust of a finger or hand from the rear."' Delaney J.Kirk &
Maria M. Clapham, "Bagging" or "Goosing": How the Courts Are Ruling in Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims, 47 LAB. L.J. 403, 403 (1996) (quoting WEBSThR'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 979 (1981)); see, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 490
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (recounting how a male butcher goosed his male subordinate with a knife
sharpening steel); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir.
1996) (revealing how a male worker goosed his male co-worker with a broomstick).
3. "Bagging" has been defined in various ways, but typically involves a deft action aimed
at a male's groin area, such as the grabbing and squeezing of his testicles. See Quick v. Donaldson
Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996). In Quick, a male was bagged on so many occasions by
various male co-workers that one of his testicles was "swell[ed] and bruis[ed]" to the point where
he experienced "a bobbing sensation" and required "medical and psychological treatment." Id. at
1375.
4. Last on this parade of horribles, to "dry hump" is to approach someone from behind and
then simulate a sex act by thrusting one's pelvis forward in a fornicating gesture. See Gerd v.
United Parcel Serv, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Colo. 1996). In Gerd, a male approached a
fellow male co-worker from behind and rubbed his thighs while simulating a sexual act. See id. As
this exchange unfolded, another male co-worker who witnessed the act announced "'wouldn't you
love to see [the victim] get down on the floor and roll around and get dirty?' Id. at 358-59; see
also Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1997) (describing how a male
"routinely placed his hands on [his male co-worker's] hips, simulating anal sex, while stating
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hearty laughter. Apparently these pranksters never pause amid the ribaldry to consider if anything is wrong with their irreverence.6
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., some courts held that even if an em-

ployer condoned these antics, the employer had not committed a legal
wrong for which the victim could seek redress! However, as Oncale
held, horseplay that rises to the level of same-sex sexual harassment is
illegal, and an employer can therefore be held liable for its occurrence. 9
In order to understand why, Part II of this Note recounts the legal history behind the cause of action for "hostile environment sexual harassment," ° explores the pre-Oncale cases that dealt with same-sex sexual

'[h]ere, let me show you how a real man takes it').
5. Other particularly egregious tales of same-sex horseplay can readily be told. See, e.g.,
Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 953 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (revealing that a
male co-worker "engaged in 'lewd and obscene ... acts' including 'inserting his finger into [a
male co-worker's] rectum, bragging about how much of his finger he was able to insert... and
walking around the plant floor holding his penis and asking male employees whether they wanted
a piece of it"'); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996)
(recounting how a male co-worker laid his penis upon a male co-workers neck, and how the victim
was restrained in a shower by two of his male counterparts and had a bar of soap pushed into his
anus).
6. Indeed, many victims of this male-on-male debauchery fail to appreciate the "humor,"
and even languish from the torment. "[M]ale sexual assault is a frightening, dehumanizing event,
leaving men who have been assaulted feeling debased and contaminated, their sense of autonomy
and personal invulnerability shattered. These effects [are] most devastating when the men [are]
sexually inexperienced before the assault." MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 8 (Gillian C.
Mezey & Michael B. King eds., 1992). Other potential problems for a male victim of same-sex
sexual assault include: confusion about sexual orientation; sexual dysfunction, such as impotence;
post-traumatic stress disorder; difficulty forming close relationships with other men; or suicide.
See Adrian W. Coxell & Michael B. King, Male Victims of Rape and Sexual Abuse, 11 SEXUAL &
MARITAL THERAPY 297, 302-03 (1996).
7. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
(refusing to hold employer liable because same-sex conduct such as "locker room antics, joking, or
horseplay .... by its very nature [is] not discriminatory"); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp.
1169, 1176 (D. Nev. 1995) (opining that in a same-sex sexual harassment case, an employer cannot be held liable because the "sexually charged atmosphere... although possibly hostile, abusive
or oppressive, is not discriminatory"). But see, e.g., Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp.
718, 728, 731 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (confronting a same-sex sexual harassment case, noting that the
plaintiff "alleged discriminatory conduct that took place on a daily basis," and concluding that an
employer could be held liable for the harasser's conduct).
9. See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1001-02 ("If our precedents leave any doubt on the question,
we hold today that nothing ... necessarily bars a claim of [sex-based] discrimination merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant)
are of the same sex.").
10. See infra Part lI.A.
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harassment," and reveals how the Supreme Court ultimately resolved
the issue." Part III presents two related theories of why heterosexual
same-sex sexual harassment occurs. Finally, building on these two
theories and Oncale, Part IV offers a model same-sex sexual harassment

clause which the labor practitioner may insert into any employer's existing sexual harassment policy.' 4 Thus, one intention of this Note is to
educate employers, their counsel and their human resources managers as
to why a heterosexual employee sexually harasses another heterosexual
employee of the same sex. By becoming sensitive to this phenomenon,

counsel can tailor the employer's sexual harassment policy accordingly
to fend off potential liability for same-sex sexual harassment claims.
II. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF SAME-SEX "HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT" CLAIMS

A. The Development of "Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment"
Claims
Employer liability predicated upon sexual harassment in the
workplace is a relatively recent trend in law." Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 employers 7 are prohibited from discriminating against their employees on the basis of their sex. A paucity of leg-

11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part Il.C.
13. See infra Part lI.
14. See infra Part IV.B. This Note is intended to provide useful information about the topics
covered, and should not be construed as legal advice.
15. During the 1970's, sexual harassment of working women by their male counterparts in
the workplace began to be acknowledged as "an unacceptable barrier to the full and equal participation of women in the work force." E. Gary Spitko, He Said,He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 56, 57 (1997). In response to this glaring inequity, a federal cause of action for sexual harassment was first recognized 23 years ago. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660-61 (D.D.C.
1976) vacated sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also CATHERINE
MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 63-65 (1979) (examining Williams).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
17. For purposes of determining if an enterprise is subject to Title VilI's purview, an
"employer" is defined as an entity with "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ....
Id. § 2000e(b).
18. See id. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ...sex .... Id.
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islative history 9 about this ban on sex-based discrimination has resulted

in confusion among judges who have endeavored to interpret the statute? Courts have generally interpreted the word "sex ' 21 inthe text of
Title VII to mean the biological difference between men and women.22
19. See Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing Title VII as a statute with "little legislative history," and noting that
Title VI's ban on sex-based discrimination was a measure "added... at the eleventh hour"). Before the House of Representatives passed Title VII, it considered an amendment that included
"sex" as a prohibited basis for workplace discrimination in order to "do some good for [women]"
by ensuring that they would receive "as high compensation for their work as do ...[men]." 110
CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). The amendment was opposed on the grounds that the bill was already
"all-embracing" by banning discrimination based on race, since the bill covered "everybody in the
United States," including "white men and white women and all Americans." Id. at 2578. The
amendment was defended on the grounds that when a qualified white woman was denied a job
because she was a woman, she would have "no recourse" without the amendment. See id. at 2579.
To combat this discrimination, the House included the proposed measure in Title VII. Hence,
Congress's "particular focus in amending Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 'sex'
was to ensure equal employment rights for women ..... Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996).
20. Compare Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (interpreting Title VII and concluding that it did not encompass
a remedy for sexual harassment) with Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-61 (D.D.C. 1976),
vacated sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (examining the legislative
history of Title VII, concluding that Congress desired a broad interpretation of the statute, and
finding a cause of action for sexual harassment based on Title VII); see also infra Part II.B.
(discussing how federal courts also struggled with the question of whether Title VII provided a
cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment).
21. For purposes of this Note, it is important to distinguish-and this Note does distinguish--"sex," which is a physical concept, from "gender," which is the "cultural or attitudinal
characteristics (as opposed to physical) distinctive to the sexes." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127,
157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Hence, "gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine to male." Id. As Professor Case noted, "[there can be ... a world of difference between
being female and being feminine" since "the categories of sex, gender, and orientation do not always come together in neat packages." Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and
Sexual Orientation:The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence,105 YALE L.J. 1,
11, 15-16 (1995). However, not every court will make this distinction, and will use the terms "sex"
and "gender" interchangeably. See, e.g., Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749 n.1 (acknowledging Justice
Scalia's distinction between the terms, and noting that "[w]hile it may be useful to disaggregate
the definition of 'gender' from 'sex' for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort,
using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman"). For ease
of comprehension, this Note has altered quotations at various points by changing the word "sex" to
"gender," and vice versa, to ensure that the terms are kept distinct.
22. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
(confronting Title VII's "dearth of legislative history" and inferring that the void "indicates that
Congress never considered nor intended that [Title VII] apply to anything other than the traditional
concept of sex"); Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749 n.1 ("Congress intended that the term 'sex' in Title VII
mean simply 'man' or 'woman'...."); Plakio v. Congregational Home, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1383,
1389 n.3 (D. Kan. 1995) (observing that with "no meaningful legislative history on what Congress
intended by 'sex,' courts have inferred from the other Title VII prohibited discriminatory motives
that the Congress in 1964 intended 'sex' to have the traditional meaning of a person's [sex] rather
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1. Elements of a "Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment" Claim
Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") as the federal agency responsible for investigating
sex-based discrimination complaints and enforcing Title VH. 4
EEOC Guidelines state that "sexual harassment," which violates
Title VII, is comprised of "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."'
The Guidelines also delineate a specific form of sexual harassment,
popularly known as "hostile environment" sexual harassment, which
occurs when the harasser's conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or [creates]
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment." 26 A statu-

than a more expansive interpretation").
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
24. See id. § 2000e-4(g)(4). The fact that the EEOC received 14,140 sexual harassment
complaints from women in 1997 while only receiving about 6,300 in 1991 evinces the recent blossom of sexual harassment claims. See Lisa Barr6-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasley, The Road
Less Traveled: Obstacles in the Path of the Effective Use of the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act in the Employment Context, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 415, 422 n.26
(1998) (citing an EEOC statistical publication). Perhaps the dramatic increase in sexual harassment
charges is attributable to America's exposure to the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy, and
the resulting increase in public awareness of the issue of harassment in the American workplace.
See Gilbert F. Casellas, Essay, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Challengesfor
the Twenty-First Century, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that four years after the
hearings, "sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC and state and local fair employment
practice agencies had increased by 150 percent").
Another recent development that should put employers on notice of the seriousness of
sexual harassment claims is that whereas million dollar settlements were once "viewed as hefty,"
this is not the case anymore since Japanese car manufacturer Mitsubishi recently opted to "shell
out $34 million" to settle a pending sexual harassment claim. Kimberly Mills, Suiting Up,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 12, 1998, at El.
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
26. Id. The other type of sexual harassment, commonly known as "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, occurs when a supervisor has taken a tangible job benefit away from a subordinate because they have rejected the supervisor's sexual advances. See id.; see, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990
F. Supp. 657, 674 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (finding no evidence of a tangible job detriment, hence dismissing the plaintiff's quid pro quo sexual harassment claim).
As previously stated, the purpose of this Note is to educate the employer and its counsel
in hopes of enabling them to prevent liability for same-sex sexual harassment by re-drafting their
sexual harassment policies. However, an employer is always liable for quid pro quo harassment,
irrespective of any language contained in its sexual harassment policy. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998) ("No... defense is available ...when the supervisor's
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion or undesirable reassignment."). For this reason, the entire focus of this Note is on same-sex, hostile environment sexual harassment.
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tory cause of action entitled "sexual harassment" does not exist.27 The
victim is being sexually harassed while the harasser is presumedly not

sexually harassing co-workers of the opposite sex-the victim is being
burdened, the thought goes, because of the victim's sex. Thus, the vic-

tim can pursue a claim against the employer for sex-based discrimination under Title VIL.
In MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson,29 the Supreme Court approved
of the EEOC's definition of hostile environment sexual harassment, and
for the first time equated that behavior with discrimination as a practice
actionable under Title VII.3 ° In order to make out a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment, 3' a plaintiff must prove that:3 2
the conduct complained of was unwelcome;"3 the unwelcome conduct

27. See Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay? The False
Dichotomyof Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentLaw, 28 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 201, 205 (1996);
see also Theodore F. Claypoole, Comment, Inadequaciesin Civil Rights Law: The Need for Sexual HarassmentLegislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1166 (1987) (pointing out that "no explicit
federal statutory prohibition of sexual harassment exists").
28. See LYNNE EISAGUrRRE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 82 (2d ed. 1997); see also Morrison v.
Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 439 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Hostile environment sexual harassment is a particular species of sex discrimination.").
Alternatively, the victim could seek damages from the harasser rather than the employer
by asserting an intentional tort claim pursuant to state law, such as battery or intentional infliction
of emotional distress. See EISAGUIRRE, supra, at 116-17.
29. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Mentor, a female worker's male supervisor "made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors .... " Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. He then "fondled her in front of
other employees ..... exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions,"
Id.
30. See id. at 66.
31. Unlike quid pro quo sexual harassment, when attempting to make out a prima facie case
for hostile environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff need not allege an economic or tangible job
detriment. See id. at 64.
32. The following sextet of elements enumerated in the text that a plaintiff must prove to
make out a prima facie case when alleging a hostile environment is an amalgam of the Supreme
Court's original definition of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim in Meritor, the
Court's subsequent refinement of this definition in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993), and the Court's recent statement about the scope of employer liability in Faragher.
33. 'The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome."' Meritor,477 U.S. at 68. The "conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that... the
[plaintiff] regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
Furthermore, consent to a sexual relationship is irrelevant because "[t]he correct inquiry
is whether [the plaintiff] by [their] conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether [their] actual participation ... was voluntary." Meritor,477 U.S. at 68. Finally,
when examining this element, the trier of fact is entitled to consider evidence of the plaintiff's
"provocative speech or dress," since this sort of evidence is "obviously relevant" to the question of
welcomeness. See id. at 69; cf Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption
of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L.
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was so severe or pervasive that it polluted the plaintiff's working environment;m the plaintiff honestly felt harassed; 5 a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's situation would have felt that a sexually hostile environment existed;3 6 the harassment was sex-based;37 and an avenue of liability to the employer. 8
REV. 1107, 1144-47 (1995) (suggesting an "assumption of the risk defense" for hostile environment sexual harassment claims by women who work for employers that "promote [the women's]
sex appeal").
34. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. The unwelcome conduct must be permeated with
"discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult." Id. at 65. The conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive [so as] 'to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). When this is the case,
"[tihe employer can thus implicitly and effectively make the employee's endurance of sexual intimidation a 'condition' of her employment." Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir.
1981). The endurance of the harassment is now "part of' the employee's job since the employee is
now faced with a "cruel trilemma" where all paths lead to remaining on the job and keeping silent:
She can endure the harassment. She can attempt to oppose it, with little hope of success, either legal or practical, but with every prospect of making the job even less tolerable for her. Or she can leave the job, with little hope of legal relief and the likely prospect of another job where she will face harassment anew.
Id.
The severity or pervasiveness of the harassing conduct will be determined in light of
"the record as a whole and ...the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1998).
A non-exhaustive list of factors a court will examine includes: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris,
510 U.S. at 23; see, e.g., Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 674-76 (observing that after the inappropriate incident, the plaintiff "never missed a day of work... [and] never consulted a psychiatrist" and could
not otherwise prove that the experience "interfered with her work," hence dismissing her hostile
environment sexual harassment claim).
35. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. "[I]f
the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation." Id. Furthermore, even though evidence of a deleterious
effect upon the victim's psychological well-being is relevant to this element, no actual psychological injury need be alleged. See id. at 22. "Such an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's
attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not require." Id.
36. "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusiveis beyond Title VII's purview." Id. at 21. "Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social
context" enables fact-finders to determine if there has been "conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998). Such an objective examination will prevent Title VII
from being transformed "into a general civility code for the American workplace." Id. at 1002.
37. "The plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the
object of harassment." Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. However, a new formulation of this element arguably exists, and discrimination is sex-based when "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."
Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, parroted this language
from Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris.See Harris,510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
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2. Employer's Scope of Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual

Harassment
In answering the question of when an employer can be held liable
for hostile environment sexual harassment,39 the Supreme Court in
Meitor determined that Congress, when enacting Title VII, envisioned
courts looking towards the law of agency for the answer."n Unfortunately, the Court sidestepped the "invitation to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability."'"

In cases where one co-worker creates a sexually hostile environment for another, the EEOC takes the position that liability inures to the
employer "where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it
took immediate and appropriate corrective action."" As one federal appellate court stated:

Because an employer is only potentially liable for negligence in
remedying and preventing harassment of which it negligently
failed to discover, courts must make two inquiries: first, into the

ring).
38. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
39. "[H]ostile environment harassment focuses on the employer's obligation to protect the
employee's psychological well-being or health from abuse for which the employer is responsible."
Leo Flynn, Legal Regulation of Sexual Harassment in Ireland A CriticalEvaluation, 1 INT'L J.
DISCRMNATION & L. 3, 6 (1995).
40. The Supreme Court concurred with the EEOC's view, as amici in Meritor, that
"Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area." Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257,
2264 (1998) ("Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling agency law principles in a
new and difficult area of federal law.").
41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Court only went so far as to state that an employer is not
automatically liable for sexual harassment. See id. When defining the terms of Title VII, Congress
chose to prohibit sex-based discrimination not only by employers, but also by "any agent[s] of"
the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). This decision "surely evince[d] an intent to place
some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
Critics asserted that the Court only succeed in creating confusion about the employer
liability issue. See, e.g., Anne C. Levy, The Change in Employer Liabilityfor Supervisor Sexual
Harassmentafter Meritor: Much Ado about Nothing, 42 ARK.L. REV. 795, 823 (1989) ("Meritor
has only muddied the waters on the employer liability issue .. "); Recent Case, Title VII-Sexual
Harassment-Seventh Circuit Adopts Employer Liability Standardsfor Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees-Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998), 111 HARv.L. REV. 1602, 1607 (1998) (suggesting that
the Supreme Court "resolv[e] the confusion engendered by Meritor').
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1998).
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employer's actual or constructive knowledge of harassment, and
second, into the adequacy of the employer's remedial and preventative responses to any actually or constructively known
harassment.43
Thus, "[a]n employer is only obligated to respond to harassment of

which it actually knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known."' Once the employer has actual or constructive notice of the
problem, the employer has a duty to take prompt remedial and preventative action that is reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 5 If the
employer is derelict in the discharge of its duty, the employer will be

held liable.4
Recently, in Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,47 the Supreme Court
answered the question of when an employer is liable for hostile environment sexual harassment caused by a supervisory employee.48 The
employer will be held liable for the acts of its supervisors unless it can
"raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages" by satisfying two
elements.49 First, the employer must show that it "exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior..
.",Second, the employer must prove "that the plaintiff employee un43. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 676.
46. See id. at 673.
47. 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). In Faragher,a female lifeguard's male supervisors created a
hostile environment for her and other female lifeguards through "uninvited and offensive touching." Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2280. The municipal employer had an anti-harassment policy but
failed to disseminate it to the plaintiff, her co-workers or her supervisors. See id. at 2280-81.
48. See id. at 2291. If employers were to be held vicariously liable for every instance or form
of sexual harassment, the primary objective of Title VII, which is to avoid harm, would be frustrated. See id. at 2292 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). This is
because employers have an "affirmative obligation to prevent violations [of Title Vill" and should
be "give[n] credit" when they engage in "reasonable efforts to discharge their duty." Id.
49. I1 at 2293. Just like the affirmative defenses of res judicata, statute of limitations or estoppel, the employer's defense must be raised affirmatively "[iln pleading to a preceding pleading." FED. R. CrV. P. 8(e). The affirmative defense is "subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence." Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2293.
50. Faragher,118 S.Ct. at 2293. "While proof that an employer had promulgated an [antiharassment] policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law,
the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case ....Id.
Immediately after the Faragherdecision, legions of commentators strenuously asserted
the paramountcy of instituting a sexual harassment policy. See, e.g., Kevin B. Leblang & Robert
N. Holtzman, Supreme Court Offers Primeron Title VII, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1998, at 5 ("In light of
Faragher, all employers should adopt.., an effective sexual harassment policy. The employer
that fails to do so can expect to be held strictly liable for any harassing conduct .. ). Addition-
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opreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
51
otherwise."
harm
avoid
to
or
employer
the
by
portunities provided
B. The Problem ofHeterosexual Same-Sex Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment
The usual hostile environment exists when a heterosexual male
sexually harasses a female co-worker. 2 In this situation, some courts
presume that the harassment occurred because of a sexual attraction,
and the "but for ...[the victim's] sex" element53 of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim is neatly satisfied.' 4 An unusual hostile
ally, employers were advised to "enunciat[e] clear procedures through which aggrieved employees
can voice complaints." Id. Finally, it was suggested that "[tihe policy should be distributed to all
employees on at least an annual basis and to new employees at the commencement of their employment." Id.; see also, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Lookingfor Guidance,N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1998,
at 5 (suggesting that an employer have the employees sign an acknowledgment so that there is no
question they read it or understood it). But see Lancaster v. Sheffler Enters., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1000,
1003 (W.D. Mo. 1998) ("Simply forcing all new employees to sign a policy does not constitute
'reasonable care.' The employer must take reasonable steps in preventing, correcting and enforcing the policy.").
For general advice on how to maximize the effectiveness of any sexual harassment policy, see infra Part V.A.
51. Faragher,118 S.Ct. at 2293. "[IW]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure
will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden .... Id. The employee's "coordinate duty"
reflects a "policy imported from the general theory of damages, that a victim has a duty" to avoid
or mitigate her damages that resulted from a statutory violation. Id. at 2292. Thus, "[i]f
the victim
could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the employer who had taken reasonable care." Id.; see, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262-63, 2271
(1998) (noting that plaintiff knew of the employer's sexual harassment policy and procedures, but
remanding the case to determine if her failure to inform any authoritative person of the harassing
conduct was unreasonable).
52. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 605 (7th Cir. 1997) (Manion, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), vacated and remanded, 118 S.Ct. 1183 (1998); see also Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Davis, 979 S.W.2d 30,44 n.12 (Tex. App. 1998) (referring to this genre of male-onfemale situation as the traditional sexual harassment scenario).
53. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); see also supranote 37.
54. In other words, but for the fact that the victim was a woman, the heterosexual male
would not have sexually harassed her. In Henson, the Eleventh Circuit utilized this presumption in
their analysis of this element:
In the typical case in which a male [employee] makes sexual overtones to a female [coworker], it is obvious that the [male employee] did not treat [other] male employees in
a similar fashion. It will therefore be a simple matter for the plaintiff to prove that but
for her sex, she would not have been subjected to sexual harassment.
Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; see also Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After
Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 680 (1998)
("here is a presumption of heterosexuality in opposite-sex cases that alleviates the need for courts
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environment could occur when, for example, a homosexual male sexually harasses a male co-worker.5 Again, even though the harassment has
now occurred within the same-sex context, 56 some courts presume that a
sexual attraction exists, and the "but for ... [the victim's] sex" element
is likewise satisfied. 7
However, when a heterosexual sexually harasses a heterosexual coworker of the same sex, and no sexual attraction exists, perplexing issues arose as to how the victim could satisfy the "but for ... [the vic-

to evaluate the causation prong of [hostile environment] sexual harassment claims."). But see
Flynn, supra note 39, at 18 (asserting that "[tlaking the harasser's actual or perceived sexual desire
into account confuses [the harasser's] motive with the intention behind the discrimination"); Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 728 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that those "who
have argued that there can be no 'sexual harassment' in the absence of sexual attraction ignore
completely the possibility that an employee may suffer harassment based on sex that is motivated
by pure misanthropy or misogyny").
The Canadian Supreme Court forcefully refuted the notion that sexual harassment only
occurs because of an individual's unbridled sexual desire for the victim. See Janzen v. Platy Enters. Ltd. [1989] 59 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 380 ("To argue that the sole factor underlying the discriminatory action was the sexual attractiveness of the [victims] and to say that their [sex] was irrelevant strains credulity."). Recently the United States Supreme Court echoed this sentiment. See
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 ("[H]arassing conduct need not
be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.").
55. See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1996)
(alleging that a hostile working environment was created for a male by his homosexual male coworker).
56. Employers should not dismiss this situation as an improbability, since "about one in 10
cases of workplace harassment involves harassment between members of the same sex ....
Linda
Burwell, Same-Sex Harassment Now a Lawsuit Waiting to Happen, CRAIN'S DEr. Bus., Apr. 13,
1998, at E6. Furthermore, in a public sector study, "a 1995 survey of 28,296 U.S. military personnel suggest[ed] that 7% of the women and 26% of the men were subjected to unwanted sexual attention from someone of the same [sex] while on the job over the previous year." Stuart Silverstein, Sexual HarassmentRuling ChartsNew Legal Frontier,L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1998, at A1.
57. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142-43. Stated alternatively, but for the fact that the victim
was a man, the homosexual male harasser would not have sexually harassed the victim. In Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit concluded that in this situation, "[the harasser's] conduct may constitute
sexual harassment since the disparate treatment is based upon the [victim's] sex." Id. at 143.
Interestingly, under this view, if the harasser is bisexual and sexually harasses both men
and women alike, there would be no disparate treatment of the victims and hence no sex-based
discrimination. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Ecklund v.
Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 339 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("Although [the female] plaintiff
alleges that [her female harasser] is bisexual, there are no allegations that [the harasser] harassed
any male employees ....
If the plaintiff had alleged that [her harasser] sexually harassed both
male and female employees, there would be no 'disparate treatment [of female employees in the
workplace]' and therefore no actionable claim .... ); see generally Robin Applebaum, Note, The
"Undifferentiating Libido": A Need for FederalLegislation to ProhibitSexual Harassment by a
Bisexual Sexual Harasser,14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 601, 602-03 (1997) (exploring and criticizing
the bisexual harasser exemption).
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tim's] sex" element of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim.58
For this reason, prior to the Supreme Court decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 9 dozens of courts struggled with the

question of whether Title VII provided a remedy for heterosexual samesex hostile environment sexual harassment claims.Wo Because of varying
judicial interpretations of Title VII, three different approaches to deciding these claims emerged from this legal quagmire.6 Even though the
holdings of some of these cases have subsequently been overruled by
Oncale, a discussion of the courts' varied approaches to heterosexual
same-sex sexual harassment claims is important. Such a discussion is
significant for purposes of this Note because the issues inherent in heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment claims are illuminated.62

1. Court Decisions Prohibiting a Cause of Action for Heterosexual
Same-Sex Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
A small number of courts construed the language of Title V1163 to
reject all heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment claims. 6 In Garciav.
58. See Papish, supra note 27, at 207; see also Storrow, supra note 54, at 680 (observing
that "[i]n same-sex cases... presumptive heterosexuality is not applied in the same way, rendering the causation prong of Title VII sexual harassment claims the object of much attention and
analysis"); Melisa C. George, Because of Sex: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 251, 255 (1998) ("This 'because of'
language has been the major source of disagreement among courts faced with the issue of samesex sexual harassment."); Gabriel A. Tenasa, Fitting a Square Peg Into a Round Hole: "SameSex" Sexual Harassment and the "Because of. . . Sex" Requirement in Hostile Environment
Claims, 67 REVISTA JuR IcA UNWERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 163, 183 (1998) ("The difficulty
stems from an unstated requirement... that the conduct complained of be sexual in nature.").
59. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
60. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) (asserting that the
claim could always be brought); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the claim could never be entertained); Quick v. Donaldson Co.,
90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (announcing that the claim could be heard under limited
circumstances); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that the claim could never be heard).
61. See Papish, supra note 27, at 208; see also Terrasa, supranote 58, at 164 ('The ambiguity of the statutory language, the scarcity of legislative history, and the factual uniqueness of each
case... resulted in a myriad of holdings, doctrines, and elements that... divided the courts and
puzzled the scholars."); Robert Brookins, A Rose by any Other Name ... The GenderBasis of
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 441, 450, 462, 479 (1998) (dividing these cases
into three lines of reasoning).
62. The sociological and legal theories concerning heterosexal same-sex sexual harassment
infra Part M will also shed light on these issues.
63. Recall that the language of Title VII states that it is improper for an employer "to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (1994).
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Elf Atochem North America,' the Fifth Circuit tersely held that such a
cause of action never exists since the "but for... [the victim's] sex"

causation element of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim
could never be proved in these cases.'
Later cases, such as McWilliams v. Faifax County Board of Supervisors,67 shed light on the reasoning behind some courts' blanket denial of heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment claims." Again focus64. See Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay? The False
Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentLaw, 28 COLuM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 201, 213 (1996);
see, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 ('Ve believe this result compelled by a commonsense
reading of the critical causation language of [Title VII]: 'because of the [victim's] sex."'); Mayo v.
Kiwest Corp., 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,383, at 87,272 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that to
interpret Title VII to cover same-sex sexual harassment would be "irrational because it is completely at odds with [the statute's] plain language").
65. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994). In Garcia,the male victim was dry humped repeatedly by
his heterosexual male co-worker. See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448. The employer dismissed this behavior as mere horseplay. See id.
66. The court noted that even though heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment situations
have sexual overtones, a cause of action for sexual harassment in these situations was prohibited
under Title VII. See id. at 451-52. Hence, the Garciacourt "flatly exclude[d]" same-sex sexual
harassment claims, "irrespective of the surrounding facts or circumstances." Brookins, supra note
61, at 451; see also Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 737 (N.D. 1l. 1996) (holding
"that a male cannot, as a matter of law, sue for sexual harassment by a fellow male under Title VII,
no matter the sexual orientations of the two").
Apparently, this reasoning did not "garner full support" in the Fifth Circuit. Brookins,
supra note 61, at 451-52. Subsequently, in the Fifth Circuit's Oncale decision, which involved the
same issues, the court felt "bound by [its] decision in Garcia"in affirming the district court's grant
of summary judgment against a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff, even though the reasoning in
Garcia was "rejected by various district courts." Oncae v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83
F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996).
67. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996). McWilliams is yet another example where horseplay in the
workplace went too far. The male plaintiff, who suffered from a learning disability, was ruthlessly
victimized by other male co-workers. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193.
The conduct involved physical assaults. On at least three occasions, [co-workers] tied
[the plaintiff's] hands together, blindfolded him, and forced him to his knees. On one of
these occasions, a [co-worker] placed his finger in [the plaintiff's] mouth to simulate an
oral sexual act. During another of these incidents, [two co-workers] placed a broomstick to [the plaintiff's] anus while a third exposed his genitals to [the plaintiff].
Id.
68. "[S]uch a claim does not lie where both the alleged harassers and the victim are heterosexuals of the same sex." Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). The majority, however, paid no attention
to the fact that that one harasser asked the victim for sexual favors, asked if he could masturbate
the victim and rubbed the victim's penis untii it became erect. See id. at 1198-99 (Michael, J., dissenting).
In dicta, the Fourth Circuit stated that if the harassment was attributable to homosexual
attraction, the "but for... [the victim's] sex" causation element would be proved, and a Title VII
action could lie. See id. at 1195 n.5. This dicta was rendered binding precedent by the Fourth Circuit in Wrightson. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am. Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir 1996). But
see Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[T]he sexual
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ing on the causation element of a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim, the court explained:

As a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in common
understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-male-on-

heterosexual-male conduct alleged here (nor comparable female-on-female conduct) is considered to be "because of the
[victim's sex]." Perhaps "because of' the victim's known or
believed prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to
sexually-focused speech or conduct. Perhaps "because of' the

perpetrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecurity.
Certainly, "because of' their vulgarity and insensitivity and

meanness of spirit. But not specifically "because of' the victim's sex.69

Hence, according to the court, the appalling conduct occurs not because of the harasser's desire to treat a member of the harasser's sex
worse than a member of the opposite sex, but because of the victim's
personal characteristics or the harasser's moral bankruptcy."0 Subsequent decisions from several district courts concurred with this reasoning and also never entertained causes of action
under Title VII based on
7"
harassment.
sexual
same-sex
heterosexual

preference of the harasser is irrelevant to a Title VII claim.").
69. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96. The court's concern about broadening the scope of
Title VII to cover heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment claims was that by doing so, the result
would be "unmanageably broad protection of the sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of
sex."' Id. at 1196.
70. Cf. Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Can it Be Sex-Related for Purposes of Title VII?, 1 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 25, 31 n.47 (1997) (noting that
the McWilliams court attributed the harassers' behavior to their own perversions, and attributed
their choice to harass the plaintiff to his prudery and vulnerability).
71. See, e.g., Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 959 (N.D. 111,1996)
(finding nothing in the language of Title VII to allow the claim, and thus holding as a matter of
law that heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment never occurs because of the victim's sex); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049-50 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (opining that the facts of a
heterosexual same-sex hostile environment case did not provide any assurance that the conduct
occurred because of the victim's sex; therefore, if the claim was allowed, the word
"discrimination" would be read out of Title VII); Gibson v. Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1109
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (following McWilliams).
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2. Court Decisions That Required Proof of a Hostile Environment For

Members of Plaintiff's Sex
For the first time, a cause of action for heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment was recognized under Title VII, albeit under limited circumstances, in Goluszek v. Smith. 2 In Goluszek, the district court discussed the legislative intene 3 behind the "because of... sex" language
of Title VII7 4 The court determined that "[t]he discrimination Congress
was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is one stemming from an
imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful
which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable
group.' The court concluded that the claim could only be allowed
when the plaintiff worked in an environment hostile to members of the
plaintiff s own sex. 76 In other words, a male plaintiff must have "worked
in an environment that treated males as inferior [to females]"77 or per72. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111.1988). In Goluszek, the male victim was incessantly badgered by his heterosexual male co-workers about his lack of sexual experience. See Goluszek, 697
F. Supp. at 1453.
73. See supranote 19.
74. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456; see also supra note 18.
75. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456; see also Storrow, supra note 54, at 706 ("According to
the court, Congress intended to outlaw abuses by the powerful against the vulnerable to degrade
the victim by attacking his or her sexuality."); George, supra note 58, at 266 ("They explained that
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII involves an exploitation of powerful positions...
.11).

76. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. "In fact, [the plaintiff] may have been harassed
'because' he is a male, but that harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the workplace." Id. Thus, "[u]nder this construction, the conditions precedent for an antimale environment [were] found where men [were] a statistical minority in the workplace, thereby
reversing their more typical cultural status as subordinator to that of subordinated." Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 753 (1997). Hence the
plaintiff in Goluszek was denied a cause of action under Title VII. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at
1456.
To further illustrate, if female X worked in a female-dominated workplace, and if heterosexual female Y sexually harassed X, as a result of whatever motivation, while ignoring the males
in the workplace, X would have had an action under Title VII since her working environment was
hostile toward members of her sex. See, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp.
1368, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing
female plaintiffs' complaint because the heterosexual female harassers harassed all the male and
female workers in the office in the same manner); Eschbach v. County of Lehigh, 70 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 44,605, at 88,480-81 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (allowing same-sex sexual harassment claim to
proceed because the heterosexual female harasser "gave women employees more work than [male]
employees" and explained to a female worker that she "liked a male [co-worker] better than a female [co-worker] 'because he has a dick and you don't'). ,
77. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. But see Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351, 354 (D.Nev. 1996) ("[Title VII] does not require that the work environment be hostile
to all workers of the plaintiff's sex; it requires that the environment be hostile to the plaintiff.").
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haps a "[sex]-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression by a
'dominant' [sex]" of which the plaintiff was not a member." However,
under the Goluszek standard, a male plaintiff would have great difficulty
proving an anti-male atmosphere. 9 Some district courts adhered to this

standard," even though it was often subjected to questioning by scholars81 and scathing judicial criticism."
3. Court Decisions That Treated a Heterosexual Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claim Like the Usual Sexual Harassment Claim
In Quick v. Donaldson Co.," the Eighth Circuit became the first
federal appellate court 4 to hold that any same-sex sexual harassment
claim "came within the ambit of Title VII." ' In rejecting the reasoning
of Goluszek, the court asserted that "[p]rotection under Title VII is not
limited to only disadvantaged or vulnerable groups."86 Furthermore, the
78. Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsiderationdenied, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
79. See Vandeventer, 887 F. Supp. at 1180 ("The 'anti-male' atmosphere that Goluszek
would require here does not exist, and it would be the rare case indeed where it did.").
80. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(dismissing the claim because the male plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the maledominated workplace was overshadowed by anti-male sentiment, or that males were treated as
inferior to females); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1625, 1628 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (concluding that "a claim of male against male hostile environment, sexual harassment
is not actionable under Title VII, in the absence of an allegation that an anti-male environment was
created thereby").
81. See, e.g., Brookins, supranote 61, at 457, 459 (criticizing the Goluszek court's "strained,
superficial analysis" because it "fail[ed] even to adumbrate the conditions that might constitute an
[anti-male] environment"); Terrasa, supra note 58, at 175, 177 (asserting that the Goluszek court
relied on "tenuous authority" in coming to this conclusion, which was "contrary to Supreme Court
precedent, contrary to the historical reality of Title VII's enactment, and in conflict with the EEOC
[G]uidelines"); Charles R. Calleros, Same-Sex Harassment, Textualism, Free Speech, and Oncale:
Laying the Groundworkfor a Coherent and ConstitutionalTheory of Sexual HarassmentLiability,
7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 21 (1998) ("Mhe plain meaning of the statutory language of Title VII
militates strongly against Goluszek and supports an expansive remedial interpretation.").
82. See, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (attacking the reasoning and "hollow core" of Goluszek and its progeny); Tanner,
919 F. Supp. at 354 ("Notwithstanding the Goluszek court's sweeping statements regarding Congressional intent, its analysis is unsupported by any legislative history.").
83. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996). In Quick, the male victim was bagged about 100 times by
at least 12 of his heterosexual male co-workers. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374.
84. See Julianna Ryan & John M. Butler, Without Supreme CourtPrecedent, FederalCourts
Struggle With the Issue of Whether Title Vll Lawsuits May be Broughtfor Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 23, 1996, at B8 ("Tjhe 8th Circuit became the first federal appeals
court to affirm the validity of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII.").
85. Brookins, supranote 61, at 463.
86. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378. Title VII's protective umbrella extends over "all employees and
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court asserted that sexual harassment can occur absent sexually aggressive behaviorY Finally, turning to the causation element, the court
pointed out that:
the key inquiry is whether "members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed." Evidence that members of one sex were the primary targets of the harassment is
sufficient to show that the conduct was [based on sex] ....The
motive behind the discrimination is not at issue because "[a]n
employer could never have a legitimate reason for creating or
permitting a hostile work environment."8
In Doe v. City of Belleville, 9 the Seventh Circuit likewise held that
any same-sex sexual harassment claim is covered by Title VII,9 albeit
for reasons different than the Quick court. First, "the facial breadth and
clarity of Title VII's language militated against narrowly construing"
the language of Title VIf' to deny coverage of same-sex claims. 9 Secprohibits disparate treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on that person's sex.' Id.
87. See id. at 1377. Under EEOC regulations, conduct that constitutes sexual harassment
includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature .... 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998). This regulation, coupled with the
notion that "Congress intended to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms," led the
court to conclude that "sexual harassment can occur in many forms, [and] may be evidenced by
acts of physical aggression or violence [as well as] incidents of verbal abuse." Quick, 90 F.3d at
1377. Thus, under this reasoning, when a heterosexual man bags another heterosexual man, this
could constitute "prohibited sexual harassment." Id. at 1379.
88. Id. at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Hence, because a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the treatment of men in the workplace
was worse than the treatment of the women, since no women were bagged at the plant, the plaintiff's claim was allowed to proceed. See id. at 1374, 1379.
89. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S.Ct. 1183 (1998). The Supreme Court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Oncale. See Doe, 118
S. Ct. at 1183; see also infra Part II.C.
90. "The [Doe] court concluded that Title VII covers same-sex sexual harassment claims as a
matter of law ..." Robert Brookins, A Rose by any Other Name ...The GenderBasis of SameSex Sexual Harassment,46 DRAKE L. REv. 441,466 (1998).
91. Id. This was in marked contrast to those courts who interpreted the language of Title VII
to prohibit same-sex sexual harassment claims. See supra Part I1.B.1. The Doe court rejected the
reasoning of those courts and noted that "[t]he language of Title VII... does not purport to limit
who may bring suit based on the sex of either the harasser or the person harassed." Doe, 119 F.3d
at 572; see also Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Ill.
1995)
("The plain language of Title VII simply does not restrict its prohibition against discrimination to
employees of the opposite sex.").
92. The Doe court also criticized the Goluszek-type "power-abuse criterion" prevalent in the
thread of cases discussed supra Part II.B.2. Brookins, supra note 90, at 467. The Doe court cau-
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ond, when the harasser's conduct is sexual in nature, this will suffice to
demonstrate "the nexus to the plaintiff's [sex] that Title VII requires,"
that is, satisfies the "but for ... [the victim's] sex" element of a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim.93 Hence, under the Doe standard,
as long as a sexually hostile environment was created for the victim, the
victim could always bring suit under Title VII, regardless of the harasser's sex.9 4 At the time, Doe offered the most protection for victims of
same-sex sexual harassment, 95 yet the reasoning still came under fire.96
C. The Supreme Court Resolves the CircuitSplit

By granting certiorari to the Fifth Circuit in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,97 the Supreme Court addressed the circuit split
tioned that "to attribute to Congress an intent solely to strike at sexual harassment reflecting the
historic exploitation of women by their male co-workers reads far too much into a legislative history that amounts to little more than a last-ditch effort to scuttle the entire statute." Doe, 119 F.3d
at 572.
93. Doe, 119 F.3d at 576; see also Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentClaims
After Oncale: Defining the BoundariesofActionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 714 (1998)

(observing that Doe, "unlike existing case law, posited that unwelcome sexual conduct in the
workplace is deeply humiliating and is proscribed for the simple reason that it is tied in some way
to [sex]"). This element was satisfied because the male plaintiff had his testicles groped by a heterosexual male harasser after he announced that he was going to "finally find out if [the plaintiff
was] a girl or a guy." Doe, 119 F.3d at 567. The court asserted that "[w]hen a male employee's
testicles are grabbed ... he experiences that harassment as a man, not just as a worker ....

In that

sense [he] is the victim of sex discrimination." Id. at 578.
94. 'Thus, so long as the environment itself is hostile to the plaintiff because of her sex, why
the harassment was perpetrated (sexual interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided humor?
boredom?) is beside the point." Doe, 119 F.3d. at 578; see also Brian Cummings, Harassment
Knows No Gender: Court, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., July 18, 1997, at 1 ("The [Seventh] Circuit panel,

in an opinion that diverges from other federal appeals court rulings, found that same-sex sexual
harassment in the workplace does not differ from male-to-female sexual harassment when the harassers' actions create a hostile work environment.").
95. See M. Claybom Williams, Note, Title VII and Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: What Is
the ProperTheoreticalBasisfor a Sexual HarassmentClaim?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 651, 662

(1998).
96. See, e.g., Storrow, supra note 93, at 714 (asserting that Doe "offered the most controversial analytical paradigm for [same-sex sexual harassment] cases.., to date"); Brookins, supra
note 90, at 469 (criticizing Doe since it "adopted an evidentiary paradigm that... eliminate[d] the
need for independent proof of either a but-for nexus or differential treatment by automatically inferring those prima facie criteria from sexually explicit conduct").
97. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). In Oncale, the male victim was sexually harassed in the most deplorable of manners by his heterosexual male co-workers. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996). while working aboard an offshore oil rig, the
plaintiff was restrained while a co-worker laid his penis upon the plaintiff's neck. See id. at 118.
Additionally, the plaintiff was held on the floor of a shower while a co-worker forced a bar of soap
into the plaintiff's anus. See id. at 118-19.
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in the area of same-sex sexual harassment.9' The decision which ostensibly would decide the degree to which same-sex sexual harassment was
actionable was eagerly awaited."
The Court unanimously ruled that same-sex sexual harassment is
always a cognizable form of sexual discrimination under Title VII,' °
and offered several justifications in support of its holding. To begin
with, the Court refuted the argument that the text and legislative history
of Title VII did not allow the action.'"' The Court also reiterated that a
same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff still has to be proved to have occurred because of the plaintiff's sex."a The Court stated that:

A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for
example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of

women in the workplace. A same-sex [sexual] harassment
plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in
a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct
at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connota-

98. Even the Clinton administration had an opinion-it "told the [Jiustices that the lower
courts were wrong" in denying the Oncale plaintiff's sexual harassment claim and "asked the Supreme Court to overturn those rulings." Richard Carelli, Court to Decide Same-Sex Harassment
Flap,CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 9, 1997, at 1.
99. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 597 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. Justice Scalia, in delivering the opinion for the Court, stated that "[i]f our precedents
leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in Titie VII necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the... [harasser] are of the
same sex." Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
101. See id. The Court pointed out that because of the complexities of human motivation, it is
counterproductive to assume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group would
never discriminate against fellow members of that group. See id. at 1001. In other words, the Court
reasoned that it is entirely possible for one man to discriminate against another man because of his
sex. In response to the argument that Titie VII could not be interpreted in light of its legislative
history to cover heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment, the Court highlighted the notion that
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils."
Id. at 1002. For discussion on the text and legislative history of Titie VII, see supranotes 18-19.
102. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. The Court implicitly rejected the reasoning in Doe, since
the Court reminded us that it "never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between
men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used
have sexual content or connotations." Id.
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tions, but
' ' °3 actually constituted "discrimina[tion]... because of.
1
•. sex.

Furthermore, the requirement of objectivity still remains" to en-

sure that Title VII will not be transformed "into a general civility code
for the American workplace."'"5 Like any other Supreme Court decision,

Justice Scalia's opinion had its critics. 0
D. What Oncale Meansfor Employers
Before Oncale broadened the scope of Title VII,"' most employers

had already taken steps to curtail sexual harassment, primarily through
the implementation of anti-harassment policies.'
Despite Oncale's
warning that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable, some commentators suggest that employers need not alter their existing sexual harassment policies.'m However, this Note argues, along with other com103. Id. Again, the critical issue in proving causation is ."whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed."' Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)); see also supra note 37.
104. See supra note 36.
105. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. The Court emphasized that in the same-sex context, Title VII
"does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact
with members of the same sex." Id. at 1002-03. The objectivity requirement "ensure[s] that courts
and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay
or intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory 'conditions of employment."' Id. at 1003. "Common
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish
between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive." Id.
106. One concern was to what extent courts should "permit the vagaries of environment to
mediate the definition of reasonableness and decency ....
Brookins, supra note 90, at 495. For
example, "'[ordinary socializing' in a lumber camp or some other 'macho' environment is likely
to differ substantially from 'ordinary socializing' in a monastery." Id. In other words, under the
objectivity standard announced in Oncale, a mooning might be acceptable under Title VII when
one male lumberjack moons another, yet the same incident would probably be branded unacceptable when a male monk moons one of his brethren. See Kathryn Abrams, Postscript,Spring 1998:
A Response to Professors Bernstein and Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1258 (1998)
(criticizing Justice Scalia for skirting "the 'what,' the 'how' and the 'why' of sexual harassment,"
for failing to offer a "theory of the wrong that purports to explain why same-sex cases should be
included in Title VII's ambit," and for providing "only a few hints as to how [decision-making] in

these cases should occur").
107. Nearly eight months after the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex sexual harassment was
actionable, the plaintiff in Oncale had procured a settlement with the defendant employer, and was
working aboard a different offshore oil rig for another company. See Oil Rig Worker, Company
Reach Settlement, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Oct. 25, 1998, at 7B.
108. See JuLm M. TAmmtNEN, SEXuAL HARASSMENT INTHE WORKPLACE 56-57 (1994).
109. See, e.g., Kristine M. Zayko, United States Supreme Court Recognizes Same-Sex Har-
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mentators, that the better idea is to tread carefully in this new area and
to "take immediate steps to amend anti-harassment policies and expand
training programs to include same-sex harassment."1 0 After all, there's

not much danger in having an extremely specific and comprehensive
sexual harassment policy."' This statement reflects the foundation of
this Note's message-a clear and explicit prohibition of same-sex sex-

ual harassment embodied in a written policy will not only deter this behavior in the workplace, but will also help employers stave off liability

if it does nevertheless occur." 2 First, the implementation of a same-sex
sexual harassment clause into an existing policy can only help satisfy
assnent(visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.fosterswift.com/labor398.html> ("For most employers, the [Oncale] decision will not require a change in policy."); Randy McClain, The Same-Sex
HarassmentIssue, SUNDAY ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Mar. 22, 1998, at 1 (reporting that one corporate lawyer "doesn't think the [Oncale] decision means any of the policies have to be rewritten"
since "[glood sexual harassment policies aren't [sex] specific"); Jennifer Laabs, What You're Liable for Now (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http:llwww.workforceonline.comlmembers/research
/harassment/3182.html> (quoting an expert on sexual harassment: "I think for most major employers, [Oncale] is just a blip on their radar screen because their policies already prohibit harassment
of any form."); Robert W. Thompson, What Does Supreme CourtRuling on Same-Sex Harassment
Meanfor Employers? (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http:l/www.shrm.orglhmews/articles/030598a.htm>
(quoting the Society for Human Resource Management's vice president: "We don't expect this
ruling to have a major impact on employers. The majority of organizations today have sexual harassment policies that are intended to apply to all individuals, regardless of the [sex] of the alleged
harasser or victim."); Kenneth M. Jarin,New Rules for Same Sex Harassment,HRMAGAZNE, June
1998, at 115, 116-17 ("Unless [a sexual harassment] policy limits the definition of harassment to
male-female situations, it should not be necessary to alter it in light of Oncale.").
110. Jane Howard-Martin, Supreme CourtDecides that Title VII Extends to Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment,METROPOLtITAN CoRP. CouNs., Apr. 1998, at 19; see also, e.g., Kevin B. Leblang &
Robert N. Holtzman, Supreme Court Offers Primer on Title VII, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1998, at 5.
("Employers must pay heed to these decisions and ensure that their policies and procedures are
structured to eradicate harassment from the workplace and provide an effective defense to liability
for any wrongful harassment that nonetheless occurs."); Laabs, supra note 109 ("Most experts say
there's going to be quite a bit of tweaking of policies, practices and training going on over the next
few years to comply with the new law because of the [Oncale] case."); Gillian Flynn, Sexual Harassment Clarified?, WoRKFORcE, May 1998, at 105, 108 ("It's essential that employers have
...
)
specific sexual-harassment policies regarding what's expected and what's prohibited.
(emphasis added); Stuart Silverstein, Same-Sex HarassmentCases Might Increase, OREGONIAN,
Mar. 8, 1998, at El (reporting that in response to Oncale, "[1lawsuit-wary employers are expected
to respond by expanding their anti-harassment policies and training programs"); Julie M. Buchanan, Same-Sex Ruling Fails to Clarify the Issue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 1998, at 21
(advising that to protect against same-sex sexual harassment claims, employers "should have a
comprehensive anti-harassment policy in place") (emphasis added).
111. See Dominic Bencivenga, Lookingfor Guidance,N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1998, at 5.
112. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Elierth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) ("Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of [anti-harassment] policies and effective grievance mechanisms."); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1998) ("Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual
harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring ....
").
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the first prong of the affirmative defense outlined in Faragher,and thus
potentially reduce employer liability."' Second, in the co-worker context, adoption of a same-sex sexual harassment policy will make it more
likely that the employer will receive actual notice of the harassment and
will have a greater opportunity to remedy the situation."' Additionally,
if a same-sex sexual harassment clause with a grievance procedure is in
place and disseminated, it will be difficult for a plaintiff to succeed in a

constructive notice argument."' Indeed, a quick look at some jury
awards for same-sex sexual harassment claims," 6 as well as some labor
arbitrators' decisions on this issue," 7 demonstrates the seriousness of
this threat to employers as plaintiffs' attorneys are beginning
to realize
8
"that these claims can be extremely worthwhile to pursue.""
It is imperative to note that in many same-sex sexual harassment
cases, co-workers sexually harassed their victims at least in part because
they did "not fit the stereotypical role for their gender."'"9 Part I1 will
113. See supra notes 47-51 and surrounding text. Take, for example, the following court's
approval of a particular employer's policy:
[Plaintiff] concedes that [the employer's] sexual harassment policy.., makes it clear
that sexual harassment is strictly prohibited ... [and] defines sexual harassment in a
broad inclusivefashion .... [Plaintiff] states she received [the policy] and read it, rcmembered looking over the sexual harassment policy, [and] understood [the] policy and
what constituted sexual harassment .... In light of these undisputed facts, there is no
genuine dispute that [the employer] exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexual harassment in its organization. Therefore, [the employer] has met
the first prong of the affirmative defense.
Duran v. Flagstar Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (D. Colo. 1998) (emphasis added).
114. See supranotes 42-46 and surrounding text.
115. See Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1366 (1lth Cir. 1999) ("When an
employer has taken steps, such as promulgating a considered sexual harassment policy, to prevent
sexual harassment in the workplace, an employee must provide adequate notice that the employer's directives have been breached so that the employer has the opportunity to correct the
problem.") (emphasis added).
116. See, e.g., J&J Snack FoodsEmployee Awarded $4.2M, RECORD (N.N.J.), Apr. 17, 1997,
at B2 (reporting a jury award of $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages in a same-sex sexual harassment case from California); Mark A. Cohen, Same-Sex
Harassment Action Produces $1 Million Verdict, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 15, 1998, at I
(reporting that a same-sex sexual harassment claim based on Massachusetts law netted a man a $1
million verdict); Alan Byrd, Brevard Woman Wins $1 M in Same-Sex Harassment Lawsuit,
ORLANDO Bus. J., June 5, 1998, at 3 (reporting that a woman from Florida received a $1 million
judgment against her employer because of same-sex sexual harassment that consisted of, among
other things, a goosing).
117. See, e.g., Panel Rules Salomon Must Pay $750,000 in Harassment Case, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 1998, at A10 (reporting that an arbitration panel ordered a major firm "to pay about
$750,000 to settle same-sex sexual harassment... claims").
118. Cohen, supranote 116.
119. Robert Brookins, A Rose by any Other Name... The Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 441, 506 (1998). Recall that "gender" in the context of this Note
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offer some provocative theories that perhaps explain why sexual harassment based on deviation from stereotypes takes place, and why this
harassment constitutes-or at least should constitute-sex-based discrimination."2 By understanding this, and by intertwining this knowledge with valuable advice relating to the prudential drafting of sexual

harassment policies,' 2' this Note will conclude with a model same-sex
sexual harassment clause' that hopefully will be useful to employers
and employment law practitioners in curbing this behavior and preventing same-sex sexual harassment lawsuits.'"

means the "cultural or attitudinal (as opposed to physical) characteristics distinctive to the sexes."
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 21;
see, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the heterosexual male plaintiff wore an earring, and that this caused his tormentors to label him a "queer"
and a "fag"); MeWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir.
1996) (pointing out that the male plaintiff had "a learning disability that had arrested his cognitive
and emotional development"); Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 810, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(revealing that the male plaintiff had "a mild personality disorder and epilepsy" and was mentally
retarded); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 490 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (recounting how
the male plaintiff, who had a "nervous disposition," was barraged with comments such as "homo,"
"faggot," "shaky" and "shaky fuck," and was goosed); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452,
1453 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (observing that the male plaintiff had "little or no sexual experience" and
blushed easily when comments were made that pertained to sex).
120. See infra Part III.A.
121. See infra Part W.A.
122. See infra Part IV.B.
123. "[Elmployers are likely to see an increase in same-sex harassment cases ....
Dominic
Bencivenga, Same-Sex Harassment,N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 1998, at 5.
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mH. UNDERSTANDING THE MOTIVATIONS

UNDERLYING HETEROSEXUAL
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

A. ProfessorFranke'sTheory of "Gender Harassment""4
s

As soon as we are born, our "gender role socialization" begins.'2
We learn to stereotype men as "active, physical, dominant, independent,
unemotional, objective [and] forceful" beings who "should be the active
initiators and pursuers in sexual situations ... ,,26 Women are stereotyped as being cooperative, subservient and compassionate. 27 Without
even realizing how they behave, sexual harassers unconsciously "are

124. The bulk of Part IH draws upon a spirited and enlightening debate between Professors
Katherine Franke of the Fordham University School of Law and Kathryn Abrams of the Cornell
Law School over why sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Franke announced her
theory of sexual harassment as a "sexually discriminatory wrong because of the gender norms it
reflects and perpetuates." Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REv. 691, 693 (1997) [hereinafter Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?].
Abrams both approved of and criticized Franke's theme. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) ("I turn to Franke's theory,
arguing that it illuminates many gendered aspects of sexual harassment, yet does not focus on the
particularized, [sex-based] dynamics of the workplace."). The volley continued when Franke responded to the criticism. See Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination:A
Reply to ProfessorAbrams, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1245 (1998). [hereinafter Franke, Gender, Sex,
Agency and Discrimination].The debate went on when Abrams responded to Franke's rebuttal.
See Abrams, supra note 106, at 1260 (turning to Franke's response).
Additionally, Professor Franke helped author an amicus brief in the Oncale case on behalf of a group of law professors who taught employment and discrimination law. See generally
Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568) (arguing for a reversal in Oncale).
125. Elizabeth Grauerholz, Gender Socialization and Communication: The Inscription of
Sexual Harassment in Social Life, in CONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS DISCURSIVE
PRACtICE 33, 35 (Shereen G. Bingham ed., 1994). Even by age two, "children ... have knowledge
of gender stereotypes." Id.
126. Id. at 38; see also Denise A. Donnelly & Stacy Kenyon, "Honey, We Don't Do Men," I1
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 441, 442 (1996) ("Males are socialized to be strong, sexually aggressive, and always in control."); CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, STILL A MAN'S WORLD 183 (1995)
("[T]o be masculine.., means to be different from and better than women."); cf. Matt C. Zaitchik
& Donald L. Mosher, Criminal Justice Implications of the Macho Personality Constellation, 20
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 227, 230 (1993) (revealing that the macho personality is a recognized personality script, and explaining how a macho man is socialized to be masculine, virile and physical); Donald L. Mosher & Silvan S. Tomkins, Scripting the Macho Man: Hypermasculine Socialization and Enculturation, 25 J. SEX RES. 60, 65-71 (1988) (exploring the shaping of the macho
personality and lifestyle of the macho man).
127. See Grauerholz, supra note 125, at 36-37.
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often merely acting out the roles they have been taught by society," and
thus, are sometimes "unaware of the hostile nature of their conduct."'"
Franke argues that sexual harassment is the way that an individual
who strays from the stereotypical boundaries of their gender is made to
conform:
[Sexual harassment] is a disciplinary practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both harasser and victim according to a system of gender norms that envisions women as
feminine, (hetero)sexual objects, and men as masculine,
(hetero)sexual subjects. This dynamic is both performative and
reflexive in nature. Performative in the sense that the conduct
produces a particular identity in the participants, and reflexive
in that both the harasser and the victim are affected by the conduct.'29
Thus, according to Franke, the primary goal of sexual harassment
is not necessarily the satisfaction of sexual urges 3 ' or the abuse of a
power differential.' 3' Rather, the harasser's aim could be the "production
of feminine women... and masculine men ....
Franke asserts, and this Note concurs, that courts should
"reconceptualiz[e] . . . sexual harassment as gender harassment."'33
When regarded in this manner, sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination because the harassment "perpetuates, enforces, and polices
a set of gender norms that seek to feminize women and masculinize
men."' 3 Franke's plea for reconceptualization is buttressed by the Su128. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employnent Discrimination,21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 361 (1980). Taub felt that women are sometimes
stereotyped as "sexual objects" by their male co-workers, whether the men do so "consciously...
or not." Id. This could be what prompts men to sexually harass women at work, creating a hostile
environment that "interfere[s] with their performance," is "uniquely disturbing" and "unduly intrusive or humiliating." Id. at 361, 368, 376.
129. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, supranote 124, at 693-94.
130. See supra notes 52-57 and surrounding text; cf.Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc.,
919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[H]arassment, like other forms of victimization, is often
motivated by issues of power and control on the part of the harasser, issues not necessarily related
to sexual preference.").
131. See supra notes 75-78 and surrounding text.
132. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, supra note 124, at 763. Stated alternatively, the goal is "to keep gender nonconformists in line." Id. at 696.
133. Id.
134. Id.; cf. Laura Eckert, Inclusion of Sexual OrientationDiscriminationin the Equal Credit
OpportunityAct, 103 COM. L.J. 311,324-25 (1998) (forewarning that "[i]t is only a matter of time
before courts" will include "discrimination based on sex stereotyping" as impermissible sex-based
discrimination).
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preme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'35 She argues
that according to Price Waterhouse, "when an employer acts on the basis of sex stereotyping, the employer has acted on the basis of [sex] in

violation of Title VII. Sexual harassment is a form
of sex stereotyping"
136

and thus is a form of sex-based discrimination.
Relevant to the theme of this Note, Franke trumpets that' "this
framework has the advantage of furnishing a principled way to approach
...same-sex sexual harassment."' 37 In Doe v. City of Belleville,3 ' the
Seventh Circuit apparently shared this view.'39 By understanding sexual
harassment as a way to make gender nonconformists conform, we not
only understand why women who work "men's jobs"' ' are sexually

harassed, 4' but why "men who fall to live up to a societal norm of mas135. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, a female worker who was eligible for partnership in her f'n was passed over, and was advised that she "should 'walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
136. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiaein Support of Petitioner at 3, Oncale (No. 96568) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250); see also Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and
Sexual Stereotyping: Historicaland Legal Perspectivesof Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J Soc.
POL'Y & L. 581, 583 (1997) ("The significance of the Price Waterhouse decision is the Court's
recognition of the discriminatory effects... [of] subconscious sex stereotypes in employment decisions.").
137. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment, supra note 124, at 694.
138. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S.Ct. 1183 (1998). In Doe,
the court observed that the male victim "apparently was singled out for.., abuse because... [his
gender] did not conform to his [co-workers'] view of appropriate masculine behavior." Doe, 119
F.3d at 580.
139. "Titie VII does not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles." Id.
140. See WILLIAMs, supra note 126, at 180 ("[O]ccupations are deeply gendered ....Jobs
are created for men or for women ....); see also Jean Wegman Bums, Horizontal Jurisprudence
and Sex Discrimination,49 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 123-24 (1997) ("Studies show that many jobs
continue to be segregated along [sex] lines ....); cf. Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence,
105 YALEL.J. 1, 86-87 (1995) (noting how the occupation of police officer is stereotyped as being
masculine).
141. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1994)
(revealing how female "floorperson," who was the first female to hold that position, was abused by
her male supervisor with sexually-charged comments); EEOC v. Union Camp Corp,, 7 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1364-65 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (describing how a female firefighter, who was the only female in
her force's history, was outcast socially by the male firefighters and had her equipment tampered
with); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (recounting how female road
crew workers were opprobriously badgered by their male counterparts); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-1501 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (providing a comprehensive list
of how female workers at a shipyard, which the employees called a "man's world," were subjected
to sexually harassing behavior by their male co-workers). "[Tihe woman who dares to do a man's
job is made to pay." Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?,supranote 124, at 764.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss2/6

26

Band: The Importance of Updating Sexual Harassment Policies to Thwart S
1999]

Importance of Updating Sexual HarassmentPolicies

culinity 142are punished by their male [co-workers] through sexual
means."
B. ProfessorAbrams's Theory of Entrenchment of Masculine Norms
Abrams argues that sexual harassment is a vehicle "to preserve
male control and entrench masculine norms in the workplace ....
The conduct is engaged in "to secure familiar working conditions or reestablish a comfort level" for the males in the workplace.'" Like

Franke's theory, Abrams posits that her theory likewise "encompasses
cases of same-sex sexual harassment."' 45 Same-sex sexual harassment

could operate not only to make masculine male co-workers more comfortable in the workplace, but could "also mark the workplace as an
46

arena in which masculinity is appropriate or even constitutive."'

Hence, any type of sexual harassment will "perpetuate the workplace as
a site of male control, where gender hierarchy is the order of the day
and masculine norms structure the working environment." 47
Although acknowledging the viability of Franke's theory of sexual

harassment, Abrams criticized Franke for not being greatly "concerned
with situating [her gender harassment theory] within the salient dynamics of the workplace."' 4 Franke responded that she was trying "to pro-

An examination of "men's experiences in predominantly female occupations" such as
nursing, teaching and librarianship led one researcher to conclude that "men and the qualities associated with masculinity are highly valued by organizations." WLLIAMS, supra note 126, at 182.
Thus, paradoxically, a man who does a "woman's job" is generally applauded for his efforts.
142. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?,supra note 124, at 696; see, e.g., cases
cited supra note 113 (recounting instances where males were sexually harassed because they were
not sufficiently masculine, at least according to the gender rules of their particular workplace); see
also Robert Brookins, A Rose by any OtherName ... The GenderBasis of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 512 (1998) ("Shyness, prudery, or vulnerability to sexual matters
is precisely the type of macho-deficient behavior that males display at their own risk, in some environments."); cf. Mosher & Tomkins, supra note 126, at 68-69 (noting that the macho man finds
a male inferior, that is, a "sissy," "wimp," "faggot," "cry-baby" or "coward," to be vexatious, and
he regards them with utter contempt).
143. Abrams, supranote 124, at 1172.
144. Id. at 1197.
145. Id. at 1172. For example, the "impulse to enforce masculine norms in the workplace"
will result in "[t]he disciplining of... a sexually inexperienced man" or "individuals who transgress gender stereotypes." Id. at 1199. The "hetero-patriarchs" who mete out the discipline have an
"almost aesthetic distaste" for the non-conformists. Id.
146. Id. at 1211.
147. Id. at 1219.
148. Abrams, supranote 124, at 1219.
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vide an overarching theory by which to understand sexual
harassment
49
generally as a kind of discrimination 'because of sex.""
C. The Relevance to Sexual HarassmentPolicies
The lesson to be learned from these theories is that when a particular workplace or occupation is gendered as masculine, employers must
be wary of the potential sexual harassment of an effeminate male
worker by his male counterparts. 50 Likewise, employers should not ignore the possibility that a masculine female worker might be sexually
harassed by her female counterparts in a workplace gendered as feminine.' Based on the sexual harassment theories presented, and the potential liability for same-sex sexual harassment under Oncale, employers must make sure that their employees allow their co-workers a
reasonable degree of latitude in expressing their genders. The employer
can attempt to ensure tolerance and mutual respect among its employees, and thus prevent potential sexual harassment suits, by drafting an
effective same-sex sexual harassment clause. Part IV offers some general tips on writing effective sexual harassment policies,'52 builds upon
those principles with the theories espoused by Franke and Abrams,'
and concludes with a model same-sex sexual harassment clause that can
be added to any existing sexual harassment policy.4
IV. CONSTRUCTING THE MODEL SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CLAUSE

This Note has discussed the current law of sexual harassment 55 as
well as same-sex sexual harassment,'56 and has provided knowledge
about the complex motivations underlying these phenomena.' Now this

149. Franke, Gender,Sex, Agency and Discrimination,supranote 124, at 1250.
150. See Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, supra note 124, at 760 (noting
that the male co-workers who sexually harassed the male victims in the cases cited supranote 119
were "policing proper masculinity in men"). The victims were humiliated because they "held a
man's job without acting manly." Id. at 765.
151. The co-workers here would be "policing proper femininity in women." Franke, What's
Wrong With Sexual Harassment?,supra note 124, at 760.
152. See infra Part IV.A.
153. See supra Parts III.A & B.
154. See infra Part IV.B.
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See supra Part II.C.
157. See supra Part lIl.
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Note endeavors to create a model same-sex sexual harassment clause. In
the first subsection, essential sexual harassment policy ingredients are
revealed.'58 The second subsection mixes these ingredients with

Franke's and Abrams's theories on same-sex sexual harassment to create the model clause."9
A. Effective Sexual HarassmentPolicies
As previously stated, in order to have an affirmative defense to a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim, it is absolutely essential

for the employer to have a viable sexual harassment policy that is disseminated to its employees. " Remember that the following points about

drafting a policy are merely general guidelines, as "[tihere is no blueprint for designing sexual harassment policies."'
First, the policy should affirmatively raise the subject of sexual
harassment 62 and express the employer's strong disapproval of the be-

havior. 163 Second, the policy should define "sexual harassment' ' and

158. See infra Part V.A.
159. See infra Part IV.B.
160. See supra notes 50, 115; see also Judith I. Pearson, Preventing Sexual Harassment:Risk
Management Tools, RISK MGMT., Jan. 1997, at 24, 26 ("A written policy is the first step in reducing the employer's liability."); ELLEN J. WAGNER, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 109
(1992) ("A well-drafted, carefully thought-out policy statement on sexual harassment can be valuable to an organization ...as a way of minimizing legal liability to the organization in hostileenvironment sexual harassment cases.").
161. JULIE M. TAMMNEN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 56 (1994)
("[D]evelopment of a sexual harassment policy is more art than science.").
162. Because the focus of this Note is on hostile environment sexual harassment, this section
accordingly omits references in the policy to quid pro quo sexual harassment.
163. See TANmIINEN,supra note 161, at 57. For example: "It is the policy of the Company to
promote a productive work environment and not to tolerate verbal or physical conduct by any
employee that harasses, disrupts, or interferes with another's work performance or that creates an
intimidating, offensive, or hostile environment." Sample Policy (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://www.ppspublishers.com/samplesexualharassment'htm>; see also 2 KURT H. DECKER,
DRAFTING AND REVISING EMPLOYMENT PoLicIES AND HANDBOOKS 224 (Supp. 1998) ("It is the
Company's policy to regard sexual harassment as a very serious matter and to prohibit it in the
workplace by any person and in any form.").
164. EEOC Guidelines cogently define "sexual harassment" as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature...
[that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1998).
On the other hand, "[w]hile it may be tempting simply to replicate... [the EEOC definition of sexual harassment]," the employer might opt to "create a statement that is clear and written in plain English rather than in legalese." WAGNER, supra note 160, at 111.
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165
provide a non-exhaustive list of acts that constitute sexual harassment.
Third, the grievance procedure should be described,'" and a promise of
confidentiality whenever possible should be made, 67 along with a
pledge not to retaliate against the complainant.' 8 Fourth, the policy

should delineate the adverse actions the employer may take against a
harassing party. 9 Some suggest that the policy should be physically
separate from general policy statements covering a variety of employer
policies.'
B. A Model Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentClause

Because there is no harm in being overly cautious when drafting a
sexual harassment policy,"' this Note now proposes a model same-sex

sexual harassment clause, which can be inserted into an existing sexual
harassment policy.

165. See WAGNER, supra note 160, at 112 ("If examples are used, include disclaimer language that clearly states the conduct portrayed in the examples is not all-inclusive but only illustrative."). Examples of behavior to be included in this list are: unwelcome sexual flirtations, advances or propositions; verbal, written or physical abuse of a sexual nature; graphic comments
about an individual's body; sexually degrading words; or displays of sexually provocative material. See DECKER, supra note 163, at 224.
166. See TAMINEN, supra note 161, at 59 (outlining a model reporting procedure). Rather
than directing claimants to their immediate supervisors, since they are the people likely to be accused, the procedure should direct the employee to a neutral party. See WAGNER, supra note 160,
at 113-14.
167. See DECKER, supra note 163, at 224-25 ("All actions taken to resolve sexual harassment
complaints through internal investigations shall be conducted confidentially."). However, absolute
confidentiality should not be guaranteed. The employer will make its required investigation, and in
the process others will necessarily become acquainted with the situation. See WAGNER, supra note
160, at 115. Strong language should prohibit unauthorized disclosure of the facts discovered or
opinions stated. See id. at 116.
168. See WAGNER, supra note 160, at 116. However, "[o]nily when it is clear that the employee is motivated by spite or malice, and is using the complaint-resolution system for personal
revenge, is the employer justified in imposing discipline." Id.
169. See id. at 114; see also TAMMINEN, supra note 161, at 61 ("[The harasser] will be dealt
with appropriately. Responsive action may include, for example, training, referral to counseling,
and disciplinary action such as warnings, reprimands, withholding of a promotion, reassignment,
temporary suspension without pay, compensation adjustments or termination."). Adumbrating
punitive measures "is a strong indication of how the organization feels about sexual harassment in
the workplace." WAGNER, supra note 160, at 114-15.
170. See WAGNER, supra note 160, at 110 ("A separate policy... indicates the seriousness
that management accords the subject, and reinforces the message that this conduct will not be tolerated.").
171. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
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MALE-ON-MALE AND FEMALE-ON-FEMALE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
POLICY STATEMENT

In addition to the sexual harassment of a woman by a man, or of a

man by a woman, it is the policy of the Company to regard same-sex
sexual harassment as an equally serious matter' and to prohibit it in the

workplace.
The Company will not tolerate the stereotyping of a job as being a
"man's job" or "woman's job."'73 Likewise, the Company will not tolerate abuse of a fellow employee because he or she is not thought of as
being "manly"
or "womanly" enough to perform his or her job compe74
tently.
"SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT" DEFINED

"Same-sex sexual harassment" consists of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. The conduct occurs because of sexual
desire, sex or gender stereotyping, or any other sexually-discriminatory
motivation. Such conduct is directed at a co-worker of the same sex, and
harasses, disrupts, or interferes with that co-worker's work performance, or creates
an intimidating, offensive or hostile environment for
75
worker.
that

172. Those responsible for handling complaints must be aware of their natural proclivity to
engage in gender stereotyping when faced with a same-sex sexual harassment complaint. For example, in Wilcox v. Dome Ry. Servs., 987 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Ill. 1997), the male victim, who was
six feet tall and 280 pounds, was sexually harassed by his male co-worker, who was five feet, eight
inches, and 160 pounds. See id. at 685 & n.3. Upon receipt of the complaint, the foreman told the
plaintiff "that he was a 'big boy' and to take care of the problem himself." Id. at 685-86. Another
example of how not to handle a same-sex sexual harassment complaint is found in Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996), where the supervisor instructed the male complainant to
"turn around and bag the shit out of' his harassers. Id. at 1375.
173. See supra note 140.
174. See supranotes 140-41 and accompanying text.
175. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998) (stating the EEOC's definition of "sexual harassment").
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PROHIBITED CONDUCT" 6

The following list is not exhaustive and provides some examples of
intolerable same-sex conduct:

1. Unwelcome or excessive roughhousing or horseplay of a 9exual
nature."
2. Unwelcome commentary
about, inquiry into, or criticism of an78
other's intimate relationships.1

3. Unwelcome commentary about a co-worker's appearance or
mannerisms that attacks the co-worker's masculinity or femininity."'
CONFIDENTIALITY

The Company promises to keep all claims of same-sex sexual har8
assment confidential whenever possible.Y
V. CONCLUSION

Because sexual harassment is the fastest growing area of employment discrimination claims,'' employers, their counsel and their human
176. See Thomas M. Sipkins & Joseph G. Schmitt, Same-Sex Harassers Get Equal Time

(visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.ljx.com/practicelaboremployment/0608samesex.html>
("Employers should be sure to include... examples of prohibited conduct that is considered same[sex] sexual harassment.").
177. According to Justice Scalia, "simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the
same sex" would likely be permissible. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998,
1003 (1998); see also Jeffrey M. Schlossberg, The Pendulum Swings Back in Sexual Harassment

Cases, N.Y.L.L, Mar. 17, 1998, at 1 ("[T]he Court's express approval of.. . 'teasing or roughhousing' might be viewed as a signal that a certain level of sexual fraternization in the workplace
is permissible .... ).
178. See Stuart Silverstein, Same-Sex Harassment Cases Might Increase, OREGONIAN, Mar.
8, 1998, at El (noting that same-sex sexual harassment typically "involves abusive locker-room
type talk" in which one man degrades another because of his lack of sexual prowess).
179. See supra notes 135-36 and surrounding text.
180. See supra note 167. An explicit promise of confidentiality whenever possible is essential
in the same-sex sexual harassment context because, for example, "[ijn a culture which is often
negative toward homosexuality, heterosexual males may under-report sexual assaults by other
males for fear of being labeled gay." Adrian W. Coxell & Michael B. King, Male Victims of Rape
and Sexual Abuse, 11 SEXUAL & MARMAL THERAPy 297, 300 (1996). "Given these powerful social norms, it is extremely difficult for a male to admit to having been sexually assaulted," Denise
A. Donnelly & Stacy Kenyon, "Honey, We Don't Do Men," 11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 441,
442(1996)
181. See Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination:A Reply to ProfessorAbrams, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1245, 1245 (1998).
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resources managers would be wise to keep abreast of every develop-

ment in sexual harassment law. Unfortunately, because of the recency of
the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,' the parameters of employer liability for same-sex sexual
harassment are presently blurry.'8 3 It is practically a necessity for every
employer to have and disseminate a sexual harassment policy in order to

avoid liability under Title VII.'" The problem this poses for employers
is to determine what, if anything, they should specifically include in

their sexual harassment policies to avoid liability for same-sex sexual
harassment. This Note suggests that employers exercise caution in this

uncharted area, and include a same-sex sexual harassment clause.
Kenneth Band*

182. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
183. See Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentClaims After Oncale: Defining the
Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 677, 678 (1998) (describing Oncale's message about same-sex sexual harassment as cryptic); Robert Brookins, A Rose by any OtherName.
. . The Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 514 (1998)
(considering how courts might handle same-sex sexual harassment cases after Oncale).
184. See supra notes 50, 115.
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